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SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1972)
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Lego is thus
significant for what it did not do.44
The adoption of the lower standard of proof for
admissibility of constitutionally challenged evi-
dence would be satisfactory if the fifth amendment
were applicable to all accuseds collectively, rather
"Perhaps the typical case where the standard would
make a difference is the so-called "swearing contest"
case, in which, for example, the defendant testifies the
police beat him and the police deny it. A number of the
lower court cases deciding the issue presented in Lego
were precisely that kind of case, indicating that the
Lego question is not purely academic. See, e.g., People
v. Harper, 36 Ill. 2d 398, 223 N.E.2d 841 (1967); State
v. Davis, 73 Wash. 2d 271,288,438 P.2d 185,193 (1968).
than to defendants as individuals. Under such
circumstances, allowing a confession to be used if
proven voluntary by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, would constitute a broad rule in conformity
with the fifth amendment prohibition against self-
incrimination, although some involuntary con-
fessions might slip through. But the dissent in Lego
is compelling because involuntary confessions will
slip through under the lower standard of proof.
To make the fifth amendment a reality for every
individual defendant, the Court should reject Lego
and adopt the higher standard of proof for ad-
missibility of constitutionally challenged evidence
INDIGENT DEFENDANT-RIGHT TO TRANSCRIPT
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971)
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971)
In Mayer v. City of ChicagoX and Britt v. North
Carolina' the Supreme Court undertook to clarify
the standard to be applied in granting free tran-
scripts to indigent defendants. The Court disap-
proved the state court denial of a transcript in
Mayer, whereas it upheld a transcript denial in
Britt.
In Mayer, appellant was convicted in state court
of the non-felony offenses of disorderly conduct
and interference with a police officer, and was fined
$250 for each offense. The trial court denied his
petition for a free transcript to support an appeal,
4
pointing out that Illinois Supreme Court Rule
607(b) authorized such requests only in felony
cases.5 The state supreme court denied a similar
petition.6 Mayer appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court, challenging the constitu-
tionality of the limitation of the rule to felony
1404 U.S. 189 (1971).
2 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
3 Defendant Mayer was convicted by a jury in the
Circuit Court of Cook County for violations of City of
Chicago ordinances which carried maximum penalties
of $500 each.
4 Petitioner appealed on the grounds of insufficient
evidence for conviction and prosecutorial misconduct.
rrI. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, §607(b) (1969). The rule
was promulgated under legislative authority to amend
code provisions governing criminal appeals, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 110A, §121-1. A 1971 amendment further
restricted the availability of a free transcript to indi-
gents convicted of an offense punishable by imprison-
ment for more than six months. 1971 ILL. LEG. SnvicE;
No. 5 1703.
6 Unreported order, noted in Mayer, 404 U.S. at 193.
cases0 The Supreme Court vacated the order,
remanding with directions to the state supreme
court where an appeal was already docketed."
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the
Court held the felony limitation an "unreasoned
distinction" violative of the due process and equal
protection requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment.9 The Court indicated that criminal proce-
dures are also discriminatory when access is denied
in cases where the indigent is fined rather than
sentenced to a prison term.1' In dictum the Court
cautioned that its holding did not mean an appel-
lant is automatically entitled to a complete tran-
script.n
In Britt, the Court, per Justice Marshall, ruled
more authoritatively that indigent defendants are
not always entitled to free transcripts. When
Britt's three day murder trial ended in a dead-
locked jury, he filed a motion for a free transcript.
The trial court denied the motion, and defendant
was subsequently retried, convicted and sentenced
7 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
8 Id.'at 199.
9 404 U.S. at 196.
10 Id. at 197.
1Id. at 198. Chief Justice Burger concurred in a sep-
arate opinion, for the reason that essential facts were
in dispute and the appeal did not center on limited
aspects of the case. He emphasized that in most cases
alternatives short of a complete transcript will suffice.
Id. at 199-201. Justice Blackmun also concurred,
pointing out that on remand the state should reconsider
appellant's status as an indigent since he was a third
year medical student at the time of trial. Id. at 201.
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to 30 years imprisonment. The North" Carolina
court of appeals affirmed the conviction and up-
held the lower court's refusal to order a free tran-
script, stating the record did not reveal a sufficient
need. 2 The state supreme court declined review."
The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to determine whether the rule requiring
transcripts for indigents was applicable.
14
The Supreme Court held that the free transcript
rule, as set out in Griffin v. Illinois, 5 applies to a re-
quest in preparation for retrial, but that in the nar-
row facts of Brill the rule had not been violated.'
6
Justice Marshall indicated that two factors are
relevant to a determination of an indigent's need
for a free transcript: (1) its value to the defendant
in presenting an effective defense, and (2) the
availability of alternatives that would adequately
satisfy the defendant's need 7 According to
Marshall the state court decision rested on the
second factor, the fact that an "informal alterna-
tive" to a transcript was available. He cited two
substitutes indicated by the lower court:* (1) the
memory of appellant together with that of his at-
torney, since the same judge, counsel and court
reporter participated in proceedings one month
after the mistrial; and (2) the availability of the
court reporter to read to the jury testimony from
the first trial should inconsistent testimony be
offered.' It is noteworthy that the nine Justices
were not in disagreement over articulating the
Griffin rule and holding it applicable to the mistrial
context. However, Justice Douglas, in an opinion
joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, taking issue
with the majority's reading of the appellate court
holding.19
Supreme Court attention to providing indigent
defendants access to state appellate courts dates
2 State v. Britt, 8 N.C. App. 262, 174 S.E.2d 69
(1970).
"3 Unpublished order, noted in Brilt, 404 U.S. at 227.
14 401 U.S. 973 (1971).
16351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16404 U.S. at 227.
17Id.
3" Id. at 228-29. Justice Blackmun concurred in the
result, but felt certiorari was improvidently granted.
Id. at 230.
9Id. Justice Douglas interpreted the state court as
basing its decision on: (1) the failure of appellant to
make a particularized showing of need, (2) the repre-
sentation by the same attorney at both trials, and (3)
the availability of the court reporter to prove suspected
inconsistencies in prosecution evidence. He considered
none of these grounds consistent with the equal protec-
ton inquiry demanded by the fourteenth amendment
and urged reversal.
from its opinion in Griffin v. Illinois2o in 1956.
Petitioners there had requested a free trial tran-
script on grounds of their indigency in order to
support an appeal from a robbery conviction. The
request was denied because Illinois required all
criminal defendants, except those sentenced to
death, to purchase their own transcripts.1 A
sharply divided Court held that the state's failure
to provide a means for indigent defendants to bring
error to the attention of the Illinois supreme court
violated the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Griffin differed from prior cases testing state
statutes against the equal protection requirement"3
in that the Illinois statute was not discriminatory,
did not make arbitrary classifications, and was not
a source for discriminatory administration. The
only constitutional inadequacy of -the Illinois
statute was that it did not go far enough in provid-
ing procedures for appellate review. By identifying
this failure to provide access to review as a four-
teenth amendment violation, the Court initiated a
use of the equal protection clause which enabled
application of the fourteenth amendment to re-
quests for transcripts at other stages of criminal
procedure,'24 for payment of court fees, 5 and for
20 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
21 .. RZv. STAT. ch. 38, §769(a) (1955) (capital
cases). The state conceded that purchasing a transcript
was the only practical means of complying with record
requirements. 351 U.S. at 14 n.4. Also excepted were
cases arising under the Illinois Post Conviction Hearing
Act, which comprised cases involving issues of constitu-
tional rights. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 37, §163(f) (1955).
"351 U.S. at 17. Justice Black announced the judge-
ment of the Court in an opinion joined by Justice
Douglas, Justice Clark, and Chief Justice Warren.
Justice Frankfurter concurred in a separate opinion.
Id. at 24. It has been stated that he agreed only with
the equal protection violation. Note, 70 Hamv. L.
REv. 126 (1957). However he did not directly express
such a limitation. His additional points were that a
state may provide checks to guard against waste by
frivolus appeals and that the majority rule should not
apply to past convictions. Justices Burton and Minton
dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Reed and
Harlan. 351 U.S. at 28. Justice Harlan also added a
separate opinion. Id. at 33. The dissenters insisted that
the constitution does not compel states to make all
defendants equal: "[Slome can afford better lawyers
and better investigations of their cases. Some can afford
bail, some cannot. Why fix bail at any reasonable sum
if a poor man can't make it." Id. at 28-29.
"See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)(administration of laws must be willfully discriminatory
in order to amount to a denial of equal protection).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47
(7th Cir. 1968) (federal defendants' absolute right to
grand jury minutes); United States ex rd. Wilson v.
McMann, 408 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1969) (mistrial tran-
[VCol. 63
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providing appeal counsel 25 Prior to Mayer and
Britt, however, at least four issues regarding Grif-
fin's applicability remained unresolved.
An initial question arose as to what types of
proceedings the free transcript rule of Griffin was
meant to apply. Some courts and statutes limited
its applicability to the appeal process. However,
under various circumstances the Supreme Court
required states to provide transcriptions of pro-
ceedings under collateral attacksl and testimony by
key witnesses from earlier proceedings.29 Lower
courts had extended Griffin to requests for mistrial
transcripts, 0 but the Supreme Court had not
spoken on its applicability.
Subsequent to Griffin the question also arose of
which offenses and penalties mandated transcrip-
tion at state expense~n Courts generally felt that
inability to pay should not entitle the defendant
to a transcript in situations where privately em-
ployed counsel would forgo the expense.n2 The
Supreme Court rejected the argument that an
indigent convicted of a "petty" offense should not
be entitled to a free transcript in Williams v. Ok-
lahoma City."A corollary argument could be made
that the severity of the penalty imposed, apart
script); Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (tran-
script of preliminary hearing at which a key state wit-
ness testified).25See eg., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) payment of court and service-of-process fees);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (payment of
filing fee to docket writ of habeas corpus).26 See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
(court-appointed trial counsel required to aid in appeal
effort); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(counsel required when requested after a jury convic-
tion, defended pro se).
27 See, e.g., Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242
(9th Cir. 1965); IND. STAT. ANx. ch. 2, §4-7309 (Burns
1968).
2 E.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).2) E.g., Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
3O E.g., United States ex rel. Wilson v. McMann,
408 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1969). But see Nickens v. United
States, 323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
31 See remarks of former Chief Justice Qua of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, in an address on Griffin
before the Conference of Chief Justices, July 10, 1957,
reprinted, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 143, 149 (1957).
2 See, e.g., the experience of Chief Justice Burger,
404 U.S. at 199-200.
395 U.S. 458 (1969). However Williams did not
fully eliminate the severity distinction because the
denial of the transcript was not criticized independent
of a general denial of appellate review. Under the Okla-
homa rule, as in Illinois before Griffin, a transcript was
a prerequisite to prosecuting an appeal. It could have
been argued that where other methods existed of bring-
ing issues before a reviewing court, defendants con-
victed of minor offenses could be denied a free transcript
in spite of their indigency.
from the classification of the offense, should also
distinguish Griffin from transcript requests in lesser
cases. Griffin and all subsequent cases before Mayer
involved requests where the petitioner was facing
the possibility of a prison term.2'
Thirdly, it was unsettled whether alternatives to
a complete stenographic transcript would satisfy
the Griffin requirement. In dictum in Draper v.
Washington 5 the Court had set out its fullest treat-
ment of possible alternatives. The Court suggested
that an agreed statement of facts, a narrative
statement based on the trial judge's minutes or on
the court reporter's notes, or a bystander's bill of
exceptions might enable indigents to maintain an
equally effective appeal3" It also urged courts to
limit transcript grants to portions relevant to
appeal issues.? No case subsequent to Draper had
authoritatively ruled that an alternative did satisfy
Griffin.
A final uncertainty about the free transcript
rule concerned whether a defendant must show the
inadequacy of possible alternatives. Courts applying
Griffin often required a showing of need by the
defendant, particularly where the state had es-
tablished procedures short of providing a verbatim
transcript.n On the other hand, at least one court
held that indigent defendants have an absolute
right to a free transcript in some circumstances.n
Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970); Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. Cali-
fornia, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389
U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. Dist. Ct. of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192(1966); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Ross v. Schneck-
loth, 357 U.S. 575 (1958); and Escridge v. Washington
Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
35372 U.S. 487 (1963). Petitioners were convicted of
robbery and, acting pro se, requested from the trialjudge transcripts to support their appeal. The judge
denied their motion on the grounds that the appeal
issues were frivolous, and the state supreme court
agreed. The Court did not hold the Washington tran-
script rule unconstitutional but struck down its appli-
cation to the Draper facts. Id. at 498. Equal protection
required the state to provide a record sufficient to per-
mit appellate review of the standard the trial court
applied in denying the request.36Id. at 495.
37Id.38 See, e.g., State v. Hailer, 247 Minn. 571, 78 N.W.2d
389 (1956) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a petition
to direct trial court to furnish transcript). Mnwm.
STAT. §632.04 ("judgement roll" and "bill of excep-
tions"), §640.10 ("synopsis of testimony") (1947).
39 United States ex ret. Wilson v. McMann, 408 F.2d
896 (2d Cir. 1969) (indigent state defendants have ab-
solute right to free transcripts of previous prosecutions
ending in deadlocked juries).
1972]
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Mayer and Britt go far to resolve these uncer-
tainties. Concerning the types of proceedings to
which Griffin is applicable, Britt represents an ex-
pansion of the free transcript rule. Although Justice
Marshall did not specifically address the distinction
between a mistrial and a direct appeal, he deliber-
ately equated transcript requests for defense pur-
poses at trial with appeal uses. His two-pronged
test for determining transcript need" is as relevant
to the effectiveness of a defense at trial as to success
on appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Doug-
las reasoned at length" that a request for mistrial
testimony is analogous to the request for a pre-
liminary hearing transcript the Court approved in
Roberts v. LaVallee." His remarks do not depart
from the majority opinion in so far as they recog-
nize that Griffin should apply.
As to whether Griffin can be distinguished on the
basis of the severity of the offense or penalty, the
holding in Mayer determined that this distinction
is irrelevant. Unlike the effort in Williams, peti-
tioner in Mayer had access to appeal independent of
his obtaining a free transcript.4 In striking the
felony requirement from the Illinois rule, the Court
drew an analogy to the felony distinction regarding
change of venue which it had invalidated in Groppi
v. Wisconsin.45 The comparison is apt in so far as
both practices suggest an impermissible subordina-
tion of constitutional rights to public convenience
and thrift.46 In addressing the severity of punish-
ment distinction urged by the City of Chicago, the
Court in Mayer emphasized that Griffin specifically
denounced a policy decision that society cannot
afford the risk of encouraging frivolous appeals.4
It stated that Griffin does not call for a balancing
between the needs of the accused and the interests
of society. The Court pointed out that even in
minor cases the need for a transcript may be sub-
stantial, as in Mayer where a medical student was
facing the collateral consequences of a criminal
record.
The third area of unsettled law, whether alter-
natives to a complete transcript are consistent
with Griffin, is addressed in both Mayer and Britt.
In Mayer the Court emphasized that the Draper
0 404 U.S. at 227.
41 See note 15 supra.
4 404 U.S. at 232-33.
4"389 U.S. 40 (1967).
" See notes 49 and 50 infra and accompanying text.
4 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
4 Se generally, Note, Equal Protection and the Indi-
gent Defendant: Griffin and its Progeny, 16 STAN. L.
Rxv. 394 (1964).
4 404 U.S. at 196-97.
requirement of "a record of sufficient complete-
ness" does not automatically entitle an appellant
to a full verbatim transcript." In Britt the Court
showed that the Grifin requirements could be
met in practice by alternatives short of a com-
plete transcript.49 Both factors indicated by the
Britt majority, the recollections of the defendant
and his attorney and the availability of the court
reporter, are peculiar to transcript requests for
use at subsequent fact-finding proceedings. The
Court approved the state court determination
that these alternatives were effective because
"[tihe second trial was before the same judge,
with the same counsel and court reporter, and
the two trials were only a month apart." 10 While
Britt states several sufficient alternatives, it does
not present a definitive list of alternatives that
may suffice in a direct appeal request. In Mayer
the Court declined to reach a determination of
whether the Illinois procedure for a "Settled State-
ment" 51 or an "Agreed Statement of Facts" 5 were
effective alternatives for appeal purposes.0 How-
ever, the Court's reasoning in the two opinions
is significant in that it negates the inference"
that the fourteenth amendment requires states
to transcribe all proceedings at the request of
all indigent defendants.
The issue of whether an indigent has the burden
of showing the need for a transcript is also resolved
in both Mayer and Britt. The defendant must
show neither the usefulness of a transcript nor
that alternatives are inadequate. The Court in
Mayer held, apart from the felony limitation, that
the denial of the motion for a free transcript con-
stituted constitutional error because the state
order denying the transcript might be read to
require that the petitioner shoulder the burden
of showing inadequate alternatives. 5 The Court
was similarly explicit in Britt: "We agree with the
dissenters that there would be serious doubts
about the decision below if it rested on petitioner's
48 Id. at 198.
"1404 U.S. at 228-30.
10 Id. at 228-29. In his dissent Justice Douglas con-
sidered the Britt circumstances "fortuities" on which
constitutional guarantees should not depend and opted
for an absolute guarantee for mistrial transcripts. Id.
at 243 n.15.
"ILL. Sup. CT. R. 323(c).
62 .. Sup. CT. R. 323(d).
&1404 U.S. at 199.
4 See Wilcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case: Poverty
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 Coaxrir L.Q. 1(1957) (analysis of immediate impact of Griffin on case
law).
55 404 U.S. at 199.
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failure to specify how the transcript might have
been useful to him." 56
But the Court is inconsistent in the two opinions
as to whether the state has any affirmative burden
of proving that alternatives meet the requirements
of Griffin. In Mayer the Court suggested:
Where the grounds for appeal, as in this case,
make out a colorable need for a complete trans-
script, the burden is on the State to show that
only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative'
will suffice for an effective a peal on those
grounds.57
However in Bril the Court suggested, after as-
suming a transcript of a mistrial is ordinarily
necessary, that judges can take judicial notice
of facts which provide adequate alternatives.-
The task of the lower court in Brilt was to measure
the informal alternative conceded by petitioner
with the Griffin standard. But the Court further
indicated that where no such concession has been
56 404 U.S. at 228. An analysis of the reasoning in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Brill points out
how completely courts must articulate the "need" to
which they are applying Griffin. The disagreement
among the Court turned on different interpretations of
the appellate court holding. State v. Britt, 8 N.C. App.
262, 174 S.E.2d 69 (1970). The state court identified
the lack of -a need for a transcript as the reason for its
holding. A majority of the Supreme Court felt this de-
termination rested on "the availability of alternative
devices to fulfill the same functions as a transcript."
404 U.S. at 228. The dissent considered the opinion
based on peitioner's failure to specify how a transcript
might have been useful to him. Id. at 231. The lower
court opinion was not clear as to which criteria it used;
but it did cite cases since disapproved which were based
on a lack of showing of value by the defendant: Nickens
v. United States, 323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963); and
Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1965).
It can only be said that the majority's reading is more
consistent with the concluding language of the North
Carolina court: "We are of the opinion and so hold that
the factual situation does not reveal such a need for the
transcript of the evidence at the first trial that the
denial thereof was a deprivation of a basic essential of
the defendant's defense." 8 N.C. App. at 26, 174 S.E.2d
at 71.
6 404 U.S. at 193.
0 404 U.S. at 230.
made, a court may, on its own initiative, explore
the possibility of effective alternatives. 9 Thus
on the strength of the dictum in Brill, trial courts
in future cases will not be precluded from ruling
alternatives constitutionally proper even if the
state does not carry its burden of proof.
In Mayer the Court declined an invitation to
reexamine Griffin, instead approving its extension
to transcript requests involving appeals from all
criminal convictions. In Britt the Court articulated
a concise summary of factors relevant in applying
Griffin. It made clear that the stage of criminal
procedure for which testimony at a prior proceed-
ing is sought is irrelevant. The Court established
its opinion in Draper as a key source for interpret-
ing Griffin, and in Brit, for the first time, approved
an alternative to a complete transcript. Although
Justice Marshall was careful to limit the extension
of alternatives beyond Draper to the "narrow
circumstances" of Brit, the decision does enlarge
the discretion of the pei.ioned judge to take into
account alternatives to a transcript." Considered
together the decisions emphasize that the severity
of an offense is irrelevant to transcript need. After
Britt's murder conviction the Court upheld the
denial of a transcript; after Mayer's fine for munici-
pal ordinance violations the Court found error
in the denial. The decision in Mayer invalidates
those statutes and court rules in jurisdictions
outside of Illinois which provide transcripts on
the basis of a felony conviction or imprisonment
requirement."
9 Id. n.6.
.oIn many states, providing a transcript is discre-
tionary with the court. See, e.g., OKrA. STAT., tit. 20,§111 (Supp. 1962); PA. STAT. AmN. tit. 17, §809-10(Purdon Supp. 1965); and State v. Hudson, 55 R.I. 141,
179 A. 130 (1935).61See, e.g., MAss. L. ANN. ch. 278, §33A (Michie
1968) (free transcript mandatory for murder or man-
slaughter convictions, discretionary for other felonies);
VA. CODE ANx. §17-30.1 (1960) (limited to felony
cases, where conviction is upheld on appeal the expense
"shall be assessed against the defendant"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 2A: 152-15, 16 (West 1971) (wheredeathsentence
imposed); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-181 (1965) (capital
19721
